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Over the last twenty years, Tibetan protest against Chinese rule has transformed 
markedly, shifting in particular from the monastic protests by inmates of the great 
monasteries of Lhasa and Central Tibet to popular protest throughout the region and in 
particular throughout the Eastern Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo, outside what is 
administratively called the Tibetan Autonomous Region. In the last three years in 
particular, the wide-scale protests and riots of Spring 2008 have been followed by a 
growing lineage of personal self-immolations, increasingly attended by the writing of 
personal testaments, the moral authority of which is gaining rapid ground both in 
Tibetan regions and amongst Tibetan exiles in India. These testaments call both for 
Tibetan independence and the return of the Dalai Lama, and for Tibetans across the 
region to come together in patriotic unity. Self-immolation is very much a novelty in 
Tibet, and it’s place in the established post-1970s discourse of non-violence set up in 
exile by the Dalai Lama has led it to have a powerfully contested quality, with the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile discouraging its use as ‘extreme’ (especially when carried 
out in democratic states like India, where several have also occurred) while celebrating 
the heroism of self-immolators themselves; by contrast, groups such as the Tibetan 
Youth Congress argue for the universal applicability of such protests because of a world 
political order, whether democratic or not, that colludes in the destruction of Tibetan 
culture and language within Tibet. This presentation for SAAG is primarily an 
augmented briefing paper written for the Scottish Parliament’s Cross Party Group on 
Tibet this summer, which describes for parliamentarians the basic features of the self-
immolations as described above. It also has a short introduction discussing particular 
aspects of the process by which such papers get written, and the kinds of argument and 
discussion that get left out. 
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Introductory remarks 
This paper is the most recent of four briefing 
papers produced for the Scottish Parliament's 
Cross Party Group on Tibet, for which the 
author has been acting as a regional advisor 
since 2007. The papers produced so far 
include: "The 2008 Protests in Tibet: Main 
Facts & Analysis" (2008); "Issues of 
Sovereignty in the Sino-Tibetan Dispute" 
(2009); "Religious Policy and State Control in 
Tibet" (2010); and finally the present paper, 
"Self-Immolation amongst Tibetans, 2009-
2012" (2012). Each of these has been 
principally drafted by the author, and later 
ratified and (in one case) partially edited by the 
voting members of the Cross Party Group, who 
are all Members of the Scottish Parliament. 
The proceedings of Cross-Party Groups in the 
Scottish Parliament are open to the public, and 
are regularly attended by interested parties and 
representatives of human rights and Tibet-
interested groups such the Tibet Support 
Groups and inter-faith organisations, as well as 
by Tibetan refugees living and working in 
Scotland. Once ratified by the Group, they are 
distributed to MSPs and to various outside 
organisations, such as other parliamentary 
groups on Tibet, Free Tibet, Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch (Asia), etc. 
The first three papers were also submitted as 
evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee of the UK Houses of Parliament, 
for which a consideration of its contents 
provided the bulk of that committee's 2008-9 
Human Rights Report section on China. 
 Providing reports for the Cross-Party Group 
has certain advantages in terms of things such 
as Research Excellence Framework (REF) 
impact statements, but at the same time 
presents various challenges to anthropologists. 
The first of these is length: at a maximum of 
4,000 words, these reports can hardly carry 
much ethnographic nuance or context, 
especially given the reading requirement of 
providing a one page executive summary at the 
beginning. Moreover, they are written with 
public and policy considerations in mind, 
usually in direct response to requests by the 
Cross-Party Group itself.  
 The conditions of presenting papers led to 
the inclusion of some arguments and the 
exclusion of others, as well as the production 
of "executive summaries" which cannot be 
regarded as the equivalent of academic 
abstracts. In particular, one major argument 
was excluded following early drafts. Many of 
the testaments of Tibetan self-immolators 
included references to concepts of patriotism 
(rgyal gces ring lugs) and national loyalty (la 
rgya) that are comparatively new forms of 
popular political protest.  
 As many Tibetologists have commented, 
Tibetan notions of political solidarity were 
weakly articulated outside Central Tibet prior 
to the Chinese Invasion of 1949/50, and Tibet 
as a whole was divided on regional, linguistic 
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and sectarian grounds that precluded most 
forms of political solidarity. Even during the 
1980s and 1990s, Tibetan protest was focused 
primarily on religious loyalty to the Dalai 
Lama's government, and was found mainly 
within those Central Tibetan areas previously 
loyal to that government. Over the course of 
the 2000s, however, protest spread throughout 
the outlying Tibetan areas of Eastern Tibet that 
had historically shown political and religious 
resistance to rule from Lhasa. Indeed, by the 
mid-2000s, these eastern Tibetan regions had 
become the principal site of cultural 
innovations stressing Tibetan nationalism, 
through demonstrations, internet cafe traffic 
and increasingly nationalist karaoke output. By 
2008, such innovations led to an outburst of 
protests and riots that, while beginning in 
Lhasa on 10 March (the anniversary of the 
Lhasa Uprising against Chinese rule in 1959), 
spread within days to the Eastern Tibetan 
areas, which eventually formed the bulk of 
protests. Arguably, the self-immolations of the 
last three years are a deliberate attempt to 
maintain the momentum of the 2008 protests. 
 The emergence of new rhetorics of Tibetan 
unity and patriotism have also mirrored the 
trajectory of Chinese state policies. From the 
early 1990s to the present, in response to the 
Central Tibetan protests of the late 1980s, key 
Tibetan sites of protest (most particularly 
monasteries) have been the subject of extensive 
campaigns of Chinese Communist Party 
'patriotic education' (rgyal gces ring lugs kyi 
slob gso las 'gyul). The goal of such patriotic 
education is the development of a sense of 
loyalty to the state and the wider Chinese 
motherland. In particular, such campaigns 
focused on party policies regarding the 
longstanding historic incorporation of Tibet 
into China, the central necessity of loyalty to 
the state at the heart of correct religious belief, 
the denunciation of the Dalai Lama as a 
political 'splittist' and, more recently, the 
necessity and benefits of recent development 
programs. In the late 1990s, these campaigns 
were also carried out in areas that were 
technically outside the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region, most particularly Eastern Tibetan 
monasteries.  
 In many respects, the testaments of self-
immolators both mirror and invert the 
fundamental political intent of the patriotic 
education campaigns, by calling for new forms 
of loyalty to Tibetan (rather than Chinese) 
sovereignty, and to the unity of (previously 
often divided) Tibetan peoples rather than the 
unity of Chinese ethnic nationalities. This kind 
of transformation is similar in overall form to 
the rise of Hindu and Buddhist nationalism in 
South Asia (Van de Veer 1996): that is, that 
while the terms of debate for the overall 
conceptual framework of the state's vision for 
an indigenous population may be accepted, 
they are transformed and inverted into a means 
for resisting state rule (Scott 1985). In effect, 
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the very means for suppressing indigenous 
dissent in Tibet became a principal means for 
consolidating it. 
 This argument did not go down very well 
with the Cross-Party Group audience when 
presented in some of its early drafts. Despite a 
long-standing acceptance of this kind of 
argument in anthropological and historical 
circles within academia, its interpretive 
framing was seen as speculative and difficult to 
prove: it was, in effect, a cultural argument, 
and rejected as such. We might compare this 
with the argument regarding self-immolations 
in the Chinese mainland, which was included: 
whilst controversial and in effect saying much 
the same thing (that Tibetan politics could now 
no longer be understood outside the context of 
Chinese state transformations), this latter 
argument was seen as more 'concrete' and 
newsworthy. 
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Cross-Party Group on Tibet, Briefing 
Paper No. 4: Self-Immolation Amongst 
Tibetans, 2009-20121 
Introduction 
Since 2009, almost forty Tibetans have 
committed self-immolation, either in Tibet, 
India or Nepal, in protest against Chinese rule 
or policies in the region. This form of protest, 
unknown amongst Tibetans prior to the 1990s, 
has quickly escalated, particularly in the 
Eastern Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo 
and, in combination with the large scale street 
protests and funerals that attend such self-
immolations, is presenting the Chinese 
authorities with serious problems of local 
policing, as well as being increasingly 
damaging to the country's international 
reputation. More broadly, this most final form 
of protest has often been attended by 
testaments and wills by self-immolators that 
are increasingly galvanising Tibetan opinion 
both inside and outside China around notions 
of nationalism and cultural loyalty in ways 
unseen in the last thirty years. 
 
The development of self-immolation as a 
form of Tibetan protest 
                                                
1 The original version of Briefing Paper No.4 may be 
found at: 
https://scotlandtibet.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/selfim
molationbriefing_june2012.pdf, and has been 
reproduced here with minor edits, including omission of 
the original Table of Contents and Executive Summary. 
The first publicly recorded Tibetan self-
immolation did not occur in Tibet itself, but 
India. On 27th September 1998, sixty-year old 
Thubten Ngodup, an ex-army pensioner who 
lived in Dharamsala and had spent much of his 
youth as a monk in Tashilhunpo monastery in 
Tibet, doused himself in gasoline and set fire to 
himself in Central Delhi when the Indian police 
authorities tried to forcibly remove Tibetan 
protesters who were carrying out an extended 
hunger strike to highlight conditions in Tibet. 
 Ngodup's subsequent death galvanised the 
Tibetan exiled community, who had become 
increasingly disenchanted with the persistent 
failure of existing exiled policies to achieve 
either meaningful change in Tibet or even 
systematic dialogue between Dharamsala and 
Beijing. However, it was not until 2009 that the 
present spate of self-immolations began in 
earnest, with the self-immolation of the twenty-  
seven year old monk Tapey in Ngaba (Ch. 
Aba) county town. Ngaba town and its 
associated Kirti monastery have been the focus 
of long-running tensions over the last ten years, 
with the closure of Tibetan-language and 
monastic schools. On the 18th March 2008, 23 
protesting Tibetans were reported killed by 
security forces during the protests that spread 
across the Tibetan Autonomous Region and 
surrounding Tibetan-populated areas. Kirti 
Monastery is reported to have been under a 
state of lockdown for several years, with a 
large security presence of up to five garrisons 
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having built up in the area. Tapey, who was 
protesting the cancellation of New Year 
religious services at Kirti Monastery, Ngaba, 
raised a Tibetan flag and photograph of the 
Dalai Lama before setting himself on fire at a 
market crossroads. He was shot by security 
services as he burned, and subsequently 
arrested. His whereabouts remain unknown. 
Two years later, in March 2011, Lobsang 
Phuntsok, another monk from Kirti Monastery, 
set fire to himself in Ngaba town, this time 
fatally. Combined, these began a long series of 
self-immolations and protests around Kirti 
monastery, representing almost half the self-
immolators (eighteen up to 30th March 2012). 
Other areas where such protests have occur 
stretch across the eastern regions of the Tibetan 
Plateau: in particular the towns of Rebkong, 
Barkham, Tawu and Charu. These five 
locations, all in eastern Tibet, have presented 
the overwhelming majority of self-
immolations; all of these areas are also linked 
to histories of wider communal protest against 
Chinese rule, especially in 20082. 
 The pace of self-immolations has increased 
dramatically in recent months: by March 2012, 
it had reached almost ten per month, from one 
per month at this point in 2011. Most self-
immolators have thus far been Tibetan 
Buddhist monks (20 up to 30-3-2012), former 
monks (7) and nuns (3), but the number also 
                                                
2 See Scottish Parliament's Cross-Party Group on Tibet 
Briefing Paper No. 1 
includes a number of students and working 
laypeople. Most self-immolations draw large 
crowds of Tibetans and often erupt into 
spontaneous protests, especially if there is any 
conflict over possession of the body with local 
security forces. The funerals of self-immolators 
are now becoming mass gatherings that attract 
thousands from across the local Tibetan 
population. Whilst generally peaceful, these 
funerals constitute a major challenge to local 
security forces and have been regularly 
blocked in situations where the authorities have 
control of the body3. In many cases, the fate of 
injured self-immolators is simply unknown, 
and families have not been informed. 
 
Interpreting self-immolation 
Considerable controversy exists as to the 
interpretation of self-immolation amongst 
Tibetans. The Chinese authorities have, 
through media outlets such as China Tibet 
Online and TibetInfor, sought to portray them 
as either the result of individual hooliganism or 
mental instability, or occurring at the direct 
instigation of the 'Dalai clique'4 (shorthand for 
the Tibetan Government-in-Exile). However, 
                                                
3 e.g. "Fiery death marks March 10 commemorations in 
Tibet", Phayul [Tuesday, March 13, 2012], 
http://www.phayul.com/news/tools/print.aspx?id=31056
&t=1; "Tawu tense after monk’s self-immolation",  
Phayul[Friday, August 19, 2011], 
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=29894&t=
1.  
4 e.g. China Tibet Online, March 20, 2012. "How the 
Dalai clique incites self-immolation". 
http://chinatibet.people.com.cn/96069/7762820.html, 
accessed 11.05/2012. 
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such endeavours have been more muted than is 
usual for such protests, and in general the 
principal state response has been to limit media 
access of any kind. 
 Both within China and in the international 
media, a principal issue that has arisen is the 
extent to which such acts are 'Buddhist' in 
nature. Many have denounced self-immolation 
as being a violent act, and are therefore 
opposed to the religious ethics supposedly 
espoused by Buddhist monks and nuns. Others, 
by contrast, have argued that self-immolation, 
while morally egregious, nonetheless harms 
no-one else and is therefore a non-violent mode 
of protest,5 and that giving up one's life for the 
sake of others (here, the Tibetan people and 
cause) is the action of a bodhisattva, or 
Buddhist hero, and several commentators (and 
at least two self-immolators) have pointed out 
tales from the Buddha's previous lives in which 
he gave up his life to save others, in one 
particular case through self-immolation. 
Indeed, Tibetan exile groups have unanimously 
taken to referring to self-immolators as gyalche 
pawo, 'national heros' (see discussion below).  
In this latter sense, debate has often centred on 
the use of terms such as 'desperate' and 
'despairing' to describe self-immolators, which 
have been used by both the international media 
and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile but 
                                                
5 Samdhong Rinpoche (Prime Minister, Tibetan 
Government in Exile, 2001-2011): interview, 21st March 
2012. 
roundly rejected by groups such as the Tibetan 
Youth Congress and Free Tibet. It is clear that 
acts of self-immolation fuse together religious 
and political aspirations amongst Tibetans. 
Lama Sopa Rinpoche, a respected incarnate 
lama who self-immolated in Northeast Tibet in 
January 2012, declared in a final tape 
recording: 
‘This is the 21st century, and this is the 
year in which so many Tibetan heroes have 
died. I am sacrificing my body both to 
stand in solidarity with them in flesh and 
blood, and to seek repentance through this 
highest tantric honor of offering one’s 
body. This is not to seek personal fame or 
glory. I am giving away my body as an 
offering of light to chase away the 
darkness, to free all beings from suffering, 
and to lead them – each of whom has been 
our mother in the past and yet has been led 
by ignorance to commit immoral acts – to 
the Amitabha, the Buddha of infinite light. 
My offering of light is for all living beings, 
even as insignificant as lice and nits, to 
dispel their pain and to guide them to the 
state of enlightenment. I offer this sacrifice 
as a token of long-life offering to our root 
guru His Holiness the Dalai Lama and all 
other spiritual teachers and lamas.’6 	  
                                                
6 Source: http://www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-
news-reports/harrowing-images-and-last-message-tibet-
first-lama-self-immolate, accessed 12/06/12. 
Sopa Rinpoche, self-immolated Darlag county town, 8 
January 2012 
journals.ed.ac.uk/southasianist   |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 15 
 Whilst most self-immolators carry out the 
acts themselves to a now almost formulaic cry 
of "Long Live the Dalai Lama! Freedom for 
Tibet!", an increasing number such as Sopa 
Rinpoche have left behind testaments to 
explain their acts, the contents of which are 
proving extremely influential both inside and 
outside Tibet. Arguably, such statements are 
re-setting the political and moral landscape of 
resistance to Chinese rule in Tibet in the wake 
of the Dalai Lama's retirement. Unlike most 
forms of Tibetan protest testament over the last 
thirty years, the majority of new statements are 
not aimed at the international community, but 
at fellow Tibetans, calling upon them to 
develop and maintain unity and to build up a 
sense of patriotism (lagya) in the face of 
Chinese rule. These ideas have been evoked by 
both lay and monastic self-immolators. Jampal 
Yeshi, the 27-year-old student from Tawu town 
in Eastern Tibet who burnt himself to death in 
Delhi on March 26th 2012, wrote in his "Five 
Point Testament": 
‘My fellow Tibetans! If you care about 
your happiness and future, you must have 
the spirit of patriotism. Patriotism is the 
soul of a nation. Moreover, it is the 
confidence in search of truth; and also the 
harbinger of a happy future. My fellow 
Tibetan! If we are spire to peace and 
happiness in par with other people around 
the world, we should hold dear to our heart 
the word ‘patriotism’. You should make 
effort in all deliberations, big or small. In 
general, ‘patriotism’ is the insight that 
distinguishes truth from falsehood.’7 
 Similarly, Sopa Rinpoche concluded his 
testament with the following call to Tibetans: 
‘To all my spiritual brothers and sisters, and 
the faithful ones living elsewhere: You must 
unite and work together to build a strong 
and prosperous Tibetan nation in the future. 
This is the sole wish of all the Tibetan 
heroes. Therefore, you must avoid any 
quarrelling amongst yourselves whether it is 
land disputes or water disputes. You must 
maintain unity and strength. Give love and 
education to the children, who should study 
hard to master all the traditional fields of 
studies. The elders should carry out spiritual 
practice as well as maintain and protect 
Tibetan language and culture by using all 
your resources and by involving your body, 
speech and mind. It is extremely important 
to genuinely practice Buddhist principles in 
order to benefit the Tibetan cause and also 
to lead all sentient beings towards the path 
of enlightenment. Tashi Delek.’ 
 
Official and public attitudes to self-
immolation 
                                                
7 Source: http://choegyaltenzin.com/2012/03/27/wishes-
of-the-latest-self-immolator/, accessed 12/05/12, 
checked against original Tibetan. 
journals.ed.ac.uk/southasianist   |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 16 
Chinese state media organisations have been 
swift to blame the 'Dalai clique' for either 
instigating or encouraging self-immolation. 
While it is certainly the case that the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile (that is, the Executive of 
the Central Tibetan Administration, led by 
present elected Prime Minister, Lobsang 
Sangay) has avoided condemning self-
immolation, and the Tibetan refugee 
communities as a whole honour self-
immolators as national heroes, there are 
nonetheless considerable tensions and 
disagreements amongst the exiled Tibetan 
communities as to how to respond to this turn 
of events. 
 Despite the views expressed by the Chinese 
authorities, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama has 
been remarkably muted on the subject of self-
immolation except to express his sadness and 
to reject any idea that he was instigating them. 
The Dalai Lama's public position has famously 
been one of staunch non-violence (ahimsa) in 
combination with international consciousness-
raising: this has led him to denounce tactics 
such as hunger strikes and 'peace marches' to 
the Tibetan border as either being forms of 
violence, or inciting it. It seems clear that the 
self-immolations in Tibet and India constitute a 
limit to this logic. In the Wall Street Journal of 
March 21st 2012, he simply concluded: "Now, I 
have nothing to say. Only pray"8. 
 As of March 2012, the CTA Executive's 
official strategy has been to discourage self-
immolation while recognising the moral worth 
of each action. In doing this, the CTA 
distinguish between self-immolation inside and 
outside Tibet, as seen in their response to 
Jampal Yeshi's death in Delhi: 
‘The CTA would like to reiterate that as 
Buddhists, life is precious. In the long-term 
interest of the Tibetan cause, we urge 
Tibetans to focus on secular and monastic 
education to provide the necessary human 
resources and the capability to strengthen 
and sustain our movement. We once again 
remind Tibetans to refrain from drastic 
actions. While Tibetans inside Tibet live 
under the repressive system imposed by the 
Chinese government, with no space for 
conventional means of protest such as 
demonstrations, hunger strikes, etc., 
Tibetans living in the free world have 
freedom and space for conventional means 
of protests which should be utilised to the 
fullest. Therefore, the Central Tibetan 
Administration reiterates its appeal to all 
Tibetans and Tibet supporters to express 
their solidarity through activities which are 
peaceful, legal and dignified. We urge 
                                                
8 Barbara Chai, The Wall Street Journal, 21st March 
2012. "Dalai Lama Says He’d ‘Welcome’ Investigation 
of Tibetan Self-Immolations". 
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everyone to remain calm in light of the 
latest emotionally-charged circumstances.’9    
 The CTA's position has been challenged by 
the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), the 
unofficial 'opposition' within the Tibetan 
refugee community. Pochung Dhondup 
Lhadar, Vice-President of the TYC, rejected 
the CTA's distinction between democratic and 
non-democratic states in the modern context, 
because of the general human rights failure of 
the international community as a whole: 
‘The leaders of this world have no right to 
talk about peace, freedom and equality. The 
twenty-first century only belongs to 
violence and economic might. The twenty-
first century is a century shrouded in 
darkness ... Those who choose to self-
immolate do not do so on a whim, on the 
spur of the moment. They think about it at 
length, they make a firm decision, and 
make plans. They decide to do this for the 
good of the nation and the good of all of 
those around them. If someone chooses to 
self-immolate, therefore, those who share 
the same cause as them should not stop 
them or try to save them, because in doing 
so they deny the fundamental reasoning 
that caused them to choose this action.’10 
                                                
9 Statement by the Press Office of the Central Tibetan 
Administration, 27th March 2012. Source: 
http://tibet.net/2012/03/27/cta-deeply-saddened-by-self-
immolation-incidents/, accessed 12/05/2012. 
10 Pochung Dhondup Lhadar (Vice-President, Tibetan 
Youth Congress), interview 31/3/2012. 
 Despite this disagreement, it is entirely 
clear that Tibetan self-immolators are vastly 
honoured both within Tibet and in exile, and 
their statements carry incalculable moral 
authority. By most ordinary members of the 
refugee community, they are regarded as a 
beacon of hope in a movement which has 
languished in the doldrums for more than a 
decade, and which even the Dalai Lama has 
denounced as ineffective and a failure11. If the 
self-immolations continue, it seems to be only 
a matter of time before the post-Dalai Lama 
exiled administration renounce their present 
hesitancy and fully back the self-immolators, 
constituting a sea change in the Tibetan 
situation. 
 
Causes of the self-immolations 
While the political merits and religious ethics 
of self-immolation have been the object of 
considerable debate, the actual causes of these 
events have largely been taken for granted. 
Several aspects of the immolations require 
attention: (a) its bushfire like development over 
the last three years; (b) its concentration on 
specific sites in east and northeast Tibet (that 
is, Kham and Amdo), to the almost complete 
exclusion of Central Tibet; (c) the 
predominance of monks, nuns and students; 
and (d), the strong emphasis on Tibetan 
                                                
11NBC’s ‘Today’, 2009. "Dalai Lama Declared 
Autonomy Proposals A Failure". 
http://tibettruth.com/2012/04/11/dalai-lama-declared-
autonomy-proposals-a-failure/ 
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patriotism evoked by the self-immolators 
themselves. 
 Firstly, immolations are clearly linked to a 
massive ramping up of the security presence by 
the Peoples Armed Police in areas such as 
Ngaba and Golok, direct internal state control 
of monasteries, and the stringent application of 
ideological programmes such as the 'patriotic 
education campaign' (rgyal gces ring lugs kyi 
slob gso las 'gyul). Such campaigns require 
monks and nuns to regularly denounce the 
Dalai Lama, adhere to the CCP's view of 
Tibetan history as an inalienable part of China, 
and concede that all legitimate religious 
commitment was based on loyalty to the state. 
As the Tibet specialist Tsering Shakya (2012) 
has commented:  
‘What links the current incidents to religion 
is that most of the Tibetans who have 
committed self-immolation have been 
monks, former monks or nuns. Their 
actions were not an obeisance to religion or 
the performing of virtue. Rather, they 
signify something entirely different: they 
are a product of “rage,” induced by daily 
humiliation and intolerable demands for 
conformity and obedience. Religious 
figures in Tibet have been particularly 
subjected to the discipline of patriotic 
education and the campaigns opposing the 
so-called "Dalai clique.” These campaigns, 
viewed by the monks as a regime of 
degradation, require them to endlessly 
feign compliance, obliging them to 
demonstrate repeatedly their patriotism and 
fidelity to the Communist Party. That is not 
an easy task to sustain, and we see that it 
has finally become something they refuse 
to do.’ 
 Secondly, the new wave of self-
immolations seem intimately linked to growing 
restrictions on both Tibetan religion and 
language schooling, hence the predominance of 
monastics and students12, many of whom are 
directly involved in such restrictions. Like 
Sopa Rinpoche, most immolators that leave 
testaments call upon their fellow Tibetans to 
maintain their language and religion as 
fundamental features of Tibetan patriotism. In 
many respects, this explains the focus on those 
eastern Tibetan regions outside the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region itself, where special 
regulations protect the local religion and 
language to a limited amount.  
 Thirdly, the epidemiology of self-
immolation – its clustering in specific towns – 
points very clearly to the importance of local 
links and forms of communication. Tibetan 
                                                
12 BBC, 20 October 2010. "Tibetan students in China 
protest over language policy". 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
11581189, accessed 12/5/2012; BBC, 27 October 2010. 
"Education reforms anger Tibetans". 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
11634364, accessed 12/5/2012. See also the UN Human 
Rights Council report on education and language in 
Qinghai, Document: A/HRC/17/29/Add.1,pp 3-7; 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/17sessio
n/reports.htm.    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self-immolators are clearly inspired by those 
that went before them, and it seems impossible 
to discount the impact of large funerals plus the 
sheer respect that self-immolators receive 
posthumously as motivating factors for future 
self-immolators. In this sense, the kind of 
piecemeal explanations presented by the 
Chinese authorities – of individual criminality 
and personal moral failings – are wholly 
unconvincing, except in the sense that they 
reveal an official prejudice that all protest is by 
definition illegitimate and therefore necessarily 
the inclination of the criminal or the insane.  
Finally, such acts are clearly part of a wider 
growth in political solidarity amongst Tibetans 
over the last twenty years, and in particular 
since the 2008 protests. Traditionally, Tibetans 
have been relatively fragmented in political 
terms, with political loyalties being local and 
sectarian within the various Buddhist schools. 
Until recently, there has been no indigenous 
equivalent for the English-language term 
'Tibet': the usual term Bö traditionally referred 
only to Central Tibet, and was rejected by most 
people in regions such as Kham and Amdo. 
Within the last ten years, however, growing 
calls for Tibetan national unity and patriotism 
have incorporated outlying Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefectures in Qinghai, Gansu 
and Sichuan, the general location of most of 
the self-immolations.  
 
 
Self-Immolation within the PRC Context 
It is important to note that the growing national 
patriotism demonstrated within self-
immolations and other forms of protest is 
generally not witnessed within the established 
exiled communities, and as noted above that 
these widespread changes within the Tibetan 
Plateau are ones that the Tibetan Government-
in-Exile has had difficulties in coming to terms 
with. It is clear that a growing cultural and 
political rift is occurring between those that 
have spent most or all their lives inside the 
Tibetan regions of the Peoples Republic of 
China, and those that have spent all or most of 
their lives in exile. In this sense, we must look 
to the larger context of the PRC to understand 
the recent spate of self-immolations. 
 To begin with, it is impossible not to note 
that the recent rise in Tibetan political 
solidarity and patriotism has emerged precisely 
during the period following the widespread 
introduction of the Chinese patriotic education 
campaigns themselves, and the majority of 
self-immolations have been carried out by 
those in direct receipt of these ideological 
campaigns. Indeed, the precise fusion of 
patriotism and religion that is seen amongst the 
immolators almost exactly mirrors the patriotic 
education campaign policy on religion (see 
above), but in this case advocating Tibetan 
rather than Chinese nationalism. Similar 
political dynamics have been witnessed in 
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nationalist movements across the globe 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, usually in response to European 
colonial rule: indigenous populations adopt but 
invert the logic of rule in order to oppose it. 
In much the same way, the kind of self-
immolations that we have seen amongst 
Tibetans in the last three years, whilst 
innovative in Tibetan cultural terms are an 
established aspect of protest across the Peoples 
Republic of China, in which public suicide 
plays a major part. Modern China has one of 
the highest suicide rates in the world - almost 
300,000 people a year or 22.23 out of every 
100,000, having risen from 13.9 per 100,000 in 
199913. This rise shows little connection to 
rates of depressive disorders14, and has been 
strongly linked to socio-economic changes 
across the PRC that generate acute financial 
pressures on individuals (mainly rural 
women)15. 
 Many such suicides involve public self-
immolation. Rather than the kind of overtly 
political suicide seen recently amongst 
Tibetans, these are carried out by ordinary 
                                                
13 World Health Organization "Suicide rates (per 
100,000), by gender, China 1987-1999". 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/media/chin.pdf 
14 Law, Samuel and Liu, Pozi (February, 2008), "Suicide 
in China: Unique demographic patterns and relationship 
to depressive disorder", Current Psychiatry Reports 
(Current Psychiatry Reports) 10 (1): 80–86, 
doi:10.1007/s11920-008-0014-5, PMID 18269899 
15 Phillips, Michael R.; Liu, Huaqing; Zhang, Yanping 
(November 3, 2004), "Suicide and Social Change in 
China", Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry (Culture, 
Medicine and Psychiatry) 23: 25–50, 
doi:10.1023/A:1005462530658. 
Chinese farmers and businesspeople who have 
fallen foul of rapid economic development, but 
who nonetheless seek to make some kind of 
public statement of their plight. In 2003, the 
Beijing authorities created an exception to the 
general legality of suicide by banned suicide in 
the sacred paving stones of Tiananmen Square. 
Such suicides – many of which involved self-
immolation - had grown common enough in 
the Square to warrant special training amongst 
its attendant police forces. As the Asia Times 
correspondent Li Yong Yan commented of the 
affair: 
‘A public suicide is usually committed to 
make a public protest over the way the 
government treats the individual and/or 
general public. The recent strings of public 
attempts in Tiananmen are proof enough. 
Without exception, they are hopeless 
victims of forced eviction from their homes. 
Developers, backed by local governments, 
never talk to the homeowners about a fair 
agreement. Instead, the developers talk 
through bulldozers. Powerless against the 
wrecker's ball, the owners turn to the courts, 
which turn them away. Then they go to the 
people's government, which never responds 
or, if it does, sends police to disperse the 
protesters. With nowhere else to turn to, 
they show up in Tiananmen Square, with a 
bottle of gasoline. Ever the law-abiding 
citizens, they douse themselves with fuel, 
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and end up being charged with provocative, 
disorderly behaviour, by the suddenly all-
efficient law-enforcement authorities.’16 
 Information regarding self-immolations 
across the PRC has not been collated, and in 
many cases – as with the Tibetan situation - the 
bodies and survivors of self-immolation have 
been removed by the authorities, often under 
mental health regulations, and their 
whereabouts are unknown. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Political self-immolations are not therefore a 
peculiar development of Buddhism or even the 
Tibetan cause, but seem rather to be a 
distinctive aspect of a wider malaise endemic 
to the modern Chinese state. That the 
combined march towards economic 
development and political consolidation in the 
Middle Kingdom leaves little room or security 
for the ordinary citizen will surprise few China 
watchers of course. However, that it might lead 
to the kind of final rejection of both personal 
aspiration and governmental order witnessed in 
political self-immolation is a troubling lesson 
for the entire international community – which 
is, in effect, all of us - that supports China's 
prodigious growth. 
 
                                                
16 "Beijing tries to snuff out public suicide", 23 October 
2003, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EJ29Ad01.html 
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